

## Message Text

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ORIGIN PRS-01

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 SS-15 CCO-00 NSC-05 NSCE-00  
ACDA-10 /032 R

DRAFTED BY S/PRS:FZBROWN:AVW  
APPROVED BY S/PRS:FZBROWN  
S/S - RGAMBLE

-----020211Z 021660 /66  
O 020123Z APR 77 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS STATE 072290 TOSEC 030222

FOR CARTER FROM S/PRS

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: SOPN (VANCE, CYRUS R.)

SUBJECT: BRZEZINSKI BRIEFING ON SALT

NO. 22

FOLLOWING ARE EXCERPTS OF KEY PORTIONS OF BRZEZINSKI NEWS  
CONFERENCE ON MOSCOW NEGOTIATIONS AT WHITE HOUSE FRIDAY  
MORNING.

BEGIN: ... FIRST OF ALL, IT CALLED FOR REDUCTIONS WHICH  
WERE OF A GREATER SCOPE THAN JUST SYMBOLIC. AND THE SECOND  
EQUALLY IMPORTANT PART OF THE PACKAGE INVOLVED A PROPOSAL  
FOR A FREEZE, FOR A HALT ON THE MODERNIZATION OF ICBM'S;  
AND I WILL TALK ABOUT THAT IN MORE DETAIL.

YOU CAN WELL SEE HOW THESE TWO KEY FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS ARE  
INTERRELATED. WE PROPOSED REDUCTION SO AS TO LOWER LEVEL  
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OF COMPETITION AND WE PROPOSED A FREEZE IN ORDER TO HALT IT  
QUALITATIVELY AND QUANTITATIVELY. THUS, IT IS IN MANY  
RESPECTS THE FIRST TRULY, GENUINELY DISARMAMENT-ORIENTED  
PROPOSAL INTRODUCED INTO STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS TALKS.

WE PROPOSED MORE SPECIFICALLY THAT PRESENT STRATEGIC AGGRE-  
GATES WHICH WERE SET AT HIGH LEVEL OF 2400 FOR EACH SIDE BE

REDUCED TO A RANGE BETWEEN 1800 AND 2000, AND HERE AGAIN  
IS A DEMONSTRATION OF INHERENT FLEXIBILITY OF PACKAGE BE-

CAUSE THIS IS SOMETHING WHICH WE WERE PREPARED TO DISCUSS.

WE PROPOSED, MOREOVER, THAT WITHIN THAT FRAMEWORK PRESENT LEVEL OF MIRV'S, WHICH IS SET AT 1320, BE REDUCED TO SOMETHING BETWEEN 1100 AND 1200. AND WE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT IN THAT CONTEXT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE THAT TOTAL NUMBER OF SO-CALLED SOVIET MODERN LARGE BALLISTIC MISSILES, PARTICULARLY THE SS-9 AND SS-18, BE REDUCED BECAUSE WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF LOWERED AGGREGATES THESE LARGE MISSILES WITH THEIR POTENTIAL FOR NUMEROUS MIRVING, INDEED SS-18 CAN BE MIRVED UP TO 8 TO 10 WARHEADS, BECOMES INCREASINGLY SIGNIFICANT AND INTRODUCES AN ASYMMETRICAL ASPECT INTO RELATIONSHIP.

ON THAT BASIS WE PROPOSED THAT BOTH SIDES FREEZE DEPLOYMENT OF ALL OF THEIR ICBM'S AND BAN MODIFICATIONS ON EXISTING ICBM'S AND INDEED LIMIT NUMBER OF ANNUAL FLIGHT TESTS FOR ICBM'S, THEREBY REDUCING LIKELIHOOD OF SIGNIFICANT MODIFICATIONS AND ALSO BAN DEVELOPMENT TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW TYPES OF ICBM'S AND PARTICULARLY BAN DEPLOYMENT TESTING AND DEVELOPMENT OF MOBILE ICBM'S, A FACTOR, AGAIN, WHICH IF NOT CHECKED, COULD INTRODUCE VERY MAJOR UNCERTAINTY INTO U.S.-SOVIET STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP.

THIS MORE SPECIFICALLY MEANT THAT ON U.S. SIDE WE WERE PREPARED TO FREEZE OUR MINUTEMAN III DEPLOYMENT -- THAT UNCLASSIFIED

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IS TO SAY, THE MIRVED ICBM -- AT 550, WHICH IS WHERE IT IS CURRENTLY. AND WE WOULD FOREGO FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS IN ALL U.S. ICBM'S AND WE WOULD ABANDON THE MX PROGRAM, BOTH FOR SILO AND MOBILE BASING.

AND WE WOULD FOREGO ANY PLANS FOR ANY OTHER ICBM'S. ON SOVIET SIDE WE PROPOSED THAT SOVIETS FREEZE NUMBER OF THEIR STRATEGIC ICBM'S, THE SS-17A, 18'S AND 19'S AT A NUMBER NOT IN EXCESS OF 550, WHICH ACTUALLY MEANS THAT THEY COULD STILL GO UP BECAUSE THEY ARE BELOW THAT NUMBER AND THESE WOULD BE SOVIET MIRVED MISSILES. GIVEN SIZE OF SOME OF THEM, THIS IS AN IMPORTANT POINT TO BEAR IN MIND FOR IT RAISES ISSUE OF EQUITY, GIVEN SIZE OF SOME OF THEM, THEIR TOTAL NUMBER OF WARHEADS EVENTUALLY COULD BE GREATER THAN OUR LAND-BASED ICBM'S WOULD PROVIDE. AND WE WOULD EXPECT THAT MLBM, OR MODERN LARGE BALLISTIC MISSILE COMPONENT WITHIN CONTEXT OF 550 WOULD NOT BE GREATER THAN 150. THIS IS IMPORTANT BECAUSE THIS WOULD PROVIDE FOR A REDUCTION.

...FINALLY, WE WOULD PROPOSE TO MAKE AN ARRANGEMENT WITH REGARD TO THE BACKFIRE WHICH WOULD GIVE US SOME ASSURANCES THAT IT WOULD NOT BE USED AS A STRATEGIC WEAPON BY THE SOVIET UNION AND THIS IS SOMETHING THAT WOULD BE NEGOTIATED

MORE FULLY WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK AND WE WOULD PROPOSE TO BAN ALL STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILES, AND THAT, AGAIN, IS SOMETHING WHICH WOULD BE NEGOTIATED. IN THAT CONTEXT, THOUGH, IT IS TO BE NOTED THAT SOVIET SIDE HAS INSISTED THAT BACKFIRE IS NOT A STRATEGIC WEAPON, THOUGH IT HAS A RADIUS OF OVER 2000 MILES. WE WOULD PRESUMABLY DEFINE CRUISE MISSILE AS BEING STRATEGIC AT LEVEL LOWER THAN THAT IN CONTEXT OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS.

I WOULD SAY THAT IF ONE ANALYZES THIS PROPOSAL IN DETAIL I THINK ONE IS JUSTIFIED WITHIN LIMITS OF HUMAN REASON, WITHIN CONFINES OF ONE'S OWN BACKGROUND, TRADITION AND UNCLASSIFIED

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CONCERNS WHICH NECESSARILY CONFINE OUR ABILITY TO BE ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN ABOUT OUR JUDGMENTS, THAT THIS WAS A GENUINE EFFORT AT AN EQUITABLE ARRANGEMENT.

WE WOULD CONSTRAIN THOSE ASPECTS OF OUR STRATEGIC PROGRAMS WHICH ARE THREATENING TO THE SOVIETS. WE WOULD WANT SOVIETS TO ADJUST SIMILARLY IN THOSE REGARDS WHICH ARE MOST THREATENING TO US.

WE WOULD CAP ARMS RACE, WE WOULD IMPOSE A LIMIT ON NUMBERS THROUGH A REDUCTION, SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION AND WE WOULD IMPOSE RESTRAINTS OF A QUALITATIVE TYPE ON OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS. THUS, WE WOULD BOTH TAKE A GIANT STEP FORWARD. I SEE A CERTAIN ANALOGY BETWEEN SITUATION IN WHICH WE FIND OURSELVES TODAY AND THE LATER 1960'S. AT THAT TIME SOME OF YOU MIGHT RECALL WE PROPOSED TO SOVIETS THAT ABM'S BE BANNED BECAUSE ABM'S INTRODUCE AN INHERENT ELEMENT OF INSTABILITY INTO RELATIONSHIP.

FIRST SOVIET REACTION TO THAT PROPOSAL BY PM KOSYGIN WAS VERY NEGATIVE, GIVEN THEIR BACKGROUNDS, THEIR TRADITIONS, THEIR WAYS OF LOOKING AT THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP. YET, OVER TIME, THROUGH A CONTINUING DISCOURSE, SOVIET SIDE CAME TO RECOGNIZE FACT THAT INDEED IN AGE OF HIGHLY ADVANCED STRATEGIC SYSTEMS INTRODUCTION OF ABM ELEMENT INTO EQUATION WAS TRULY DESTABILIZING AND MOST IMPORTANT ACCOMPLISHMENT OF SALT I WAS PRECISELY THAT WHICH SOVIETS EARLIER HAD SO INDIGNANTLY REJECTED, NAMELY, A BAN ON ABM SYSTEMS. WE ARE THUS IN FIRST PHASE OF AN AMBITIOUS AND FAR-REACHING SEARCH FOR A SIGNIFICANT AMERICAN-SOVIET ACCOMMODATION.

WE BELIEVE IN SOME RESPECTS WE ARE IN EARLIER EDUCATIONAL "" PART OF PROCESS IN WHICH BOTH SIDES HAVE TO THINK THROUGH IMPLICATIONS, BOTH OF AN UNCHECKED ARMS RACE AND OF BENEFITS OF REDUCTIONS AND A FREEZE. UNCLASSIFIED

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WE ARE GOING TO CONTINUE THESE TALKS WITH SOVIETS. YOU KNOW THAT THEY WILL BE CONTINUED, ON A TOP-LEVEL BASIS, IN MAY BY SECRETARY VANCE AND FM GROMYKO, AND WE EXPECT TO HAVE CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES PRIOR TO THAT DATE. WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT SEARCH FOR SOMETHING TRULY SIGNIFICANT WILL BEAR FRUIT.

I DON'T THINK ANYONE IN THIS HOUSE OR IN THIS CITY, ENGAGED IN THIS PROCESS, EXPECTED THE SOVIET UNION SIMPLY TO ACCEPT THESE PROPOSALS INSTANTLY.

WE WENT TO THEM IN ORDER TO PRESENT TO THEM OUR VIEWS REGARDING WHAT MIGHT CONSTITUTE A TRULY CREATIVE AND HISTORICALLY NOVEL FRAMEWORK FOR OUR STRATEGIC RELATIONS. WE WILL PERSIST IN THAT EFFORT AND WE ARE HOPEFUL, ON BASIS OF PRIOR EXPERIENCE AND GIVEN OVERRIDING INTEREST THAT BOTH SIDES HAVE IN STABILITY AND ACCOMMODATION, WITH PATIENCE AND WITH PERSISTENCE, AND WITH GOOD WILL ON BOTH SIDES, THERE WILL BE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS MADE TOWARDS WHAT COULD BE A VERY SIGNIFICANT TURN IN AMERICAN-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP.

IN REGARDS TO THE CRUISE MISSILE, OUR POSITION IS THAT A CRUISE MISSILE, WHICH IS NOT CAPABLE OF EMPLOYMENT EITHER IN A TRANSCONTINENTAL OPERATION OR WHICH DOESN'T HAVE A RANGE IN EXCESS OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS THAT ARE TYPICALLY CONSIDERED TO BE STRATEGIC, IS NON-STRATEGIC. AND SINCE THERE HAS BEEN AN ONGOING DISCUSSION WITH THE SOVIETS AS TO WHAT IS AND IS NOT A STRATEGIC WEAPON, WE WOULD WANT TO REACH A MORE PRECISE DEFINITION OF THAT IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, BANNING THOSE CRUISE MISSILES WHICH HAVE AS THEMSELVES A STRATEGIC RANGE, AND RETAIN FOR BOTH SIDES FLEXIBILITY FOR THOSE THAT ARE NOT.

I SHOULD ADD ALSO THAT IF ANY OF THE CRUISE MISSILES THAT  
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WOULD BE RETAINED BY BOTH SIDES WERE TO BE PLACED, FOR EXAMPLE, ON THE BOMBERS, THESE BOMBERS WOULD THEN COUNT AS A MIRV WEAPON AND WOULD THEREFORE BE COUNTED WITHIN THE MIRV AGGREGATE.

SPECIFICALLY TALKING ABOUT THE MIRVS, OUR PROPOSAL IS TO FREEZE THE LAND-BASED ICBMS THAT CAN BE MIRVED AT 550 AND TO REDUCE PARTICULARLY THE NUMBER OF THOSE VERY LARGE SOVIET ICBMS WHICH CAN BE MIRVED INTO VERY NUMEROUS WARHEADS, GIVEN THEIR THROW WEIGHT, BECAUSE THAT, IN THE LONG RUN, COULD INTRODUCE AN ELEMENT OF INSTABILITY FOR BOTH SIDES.

WE WOULD, AT THE SAME TIME, IN THAT CONTEXT, FOREGO THOSE

SYSTEMS WHICH ARE PARTICULARLY THREATENING TO THE SOVIET LAND-BASED ICBM FORCE. IT IS TO BE REMEMBERED IN THIS CONTEXT THAT AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING, THE SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES ARE HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON THEIR LAND-BASED ICBMS. THOSE AMERICAN SYSTEMS WHICH COULD THREATEN THESE LAND-BASED ICBMS ARE NATURALLY AND UNDERSTANDABLY PARTICULARLY THREATENING TO THE SOVIETS.

SO, WE TRY TO TAKE THAT CONCERN OF THEIRS INTO ACCOUNT WHILE REGISTERING WITH THEM WHAT WE CONSIDER TO BE A LEGITIMATE CONCERN OF OURS, NAMELY, THAT WE DON'T WANT THEM TO ACQUIRE A CAPABILITY TO VERY SIGNIFICANTLY THREATEN OUR LAND-BASED SYSTEMS.

CHRISTOPHER

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 22-Sep-1999 12:00:00 am  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** TOSEC, PRESS CONFERENCES, SALT (ARMS CONTROL), NEGOTIATIONS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Sent Date:** 02-Apr-1977 12:00:00 am  
**Decaption Date:** 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** n/a  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:**  
**Disposition Date:** 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
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**Document Source:** ADS  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** S/PRS:FZBROWN:AVW  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** N/A  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Expiration:**  
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**Format:** TEL  
**From:** STATE  
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**Office:** ORIGIN PRS  
**Original Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 5  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 25-Jan-2005 12:00:00 am  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 2668096  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** BRZEZINSKI BRIEFING ON SALT  
**TAGS:** SOPN, PARM, US, UR, (VANCE, CYRUS R), (BRZEZINSKI, ZBIGNIEW)  
**To:** SECRETARY  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvwkey:** odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/0201b49b-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
22 May 2009  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009